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Abstract
In this article the idea of random variables over the set theoretic uni-
verse is investigated. We explore what it can mean for a random set
to have a specific probability of belonging to an antecedently given
class of sets.
1 Introduction
Probabilistic notions have been applied to mathematical objects and no-
tions. For instance, probabilistic concepts have been applied in the theory
of random graphs [Alon et al 2000]. The aim of this article is to apply a
notion of probability to the mathematical universe as a whole. More in
particular, we wish to explicate what it could mean for a property A of sets to
have a probability of being true of a set y in the set theoretic universe V. Prop-
erties are identified with their extensions, so that A ranges over all proper
and improper classes in V.
The aim is to develop a theory of the probability of events of the form
A(τ), where A is a class and the variable τ is a random variable. The state
∗Versions of this paper have been presented a Bristol–Leuven workshop on Logic and
Philosophy of Science (2015), at the Philosophy Department of the Universidade Fed-
eral do Rio Grande do Norte (2015), the Fourth Reasoning Conference in Manchester
(2015), the Philosophy of Mathematics Seminar in Oxford (2014), and at the Philosophy
Departmental Research Seminar in Aberdeen (2014). We are grateful to the audiences for
helpful comments, questions, and suggestions. In this respect we are especially indebted
to Philip Welch, George Wilmers, and Sylvia Wenmackers.
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space of the random variables is of course V. The outcome space of the ran-
dom variables has to be at least as large asV because there must be enough
states for a random variable to take each set as a possible value. On the
other hand, there is no need for it to be larger than V. Therefore the out-
come space is simply identified with V.
Without invoking fixed set of postulates, intuitions about probability
have occasionally been used in set theory, for instance to motivate new ba-
sic principles [Freiling 1986]. However, such attempts are mostly regarded
as unsuccessful [Hamkins 2015]. In the light of this it is natural to wonder
what we should require from probability functions associated with ran-
dom variables on V.
Surely it would be unreasonable to insist on there being one unique cor-
rect probability function that yields the probability of a random variable
taking a value in a given class of sets. On the other hand, for our func-
tions to have any hope of meriting the label probability function, they have
to satisfy Kolmogorov’s conditions for being a finitely additive probability
function.
From the outset we impose additional constraints on the class of prob-
ability functions that we are interested in:1
1. Totality. The probability functions are defined on all classes.
2. Uniformity. All singleton events are given the same probability.
3. Regularity. All singleton events are given non-zero probability.
All this means, for familiar reasons, that the sought-for probability func-
tions cannot be Kolmogorov probability functions. Given our insistence
on finite additivity, this means that the probability functions will be non-
Archimedean. They will not satisfy σ-additivity, but they will instead sat-
isfy a generalised infinite additivity rule.
In mathematics today, the term ‘probability’ has become virtually syn-
onymous with ‘function that satisfies the Kolmogorov axioms (including σ-
additivity)’. If you see matters this way, then you will will be loath to
dignify the functions constructed in this paper by the term ‘probability
function’. Nonetheless, you may ask the question whether a fine-grained
quantitative theory of possibility, with which the degree of possibility of
1For a discussion of these constraints in the context of non-Archimedean probability
theory, see [Benci et al 2018].
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properties can quantitatively be compared, can be constructed. This is
what is investigated in the present article. So, if you prefer, you can call
the theory constructed in this paper a quantitative theory of possibility. You
are then advised to replace all occurrences of ‘(non-standard) probability
function’ by ‘quantitative possibility function’.
The project in which we are engaging in this article is related to the
work in [Benci et al 2007]. The aim of the latter article is to construct a the-
ory of sizes for mathematical universes inspired by the Euclidean principle
that the size of the whole is larger than the sizes of its proper parts. Now
there is of course a familiar theory of size—Cantor’s theory of cardinality,—
which does not satisfy this Euclidean principle. So Benci and his co-authors
propose their Euclidean theory of size as a rival to Cantor’s theory.
We, on the other hand, fully accept Cantor’s theory of cardinality. None-
theless, the probability functions that will be constructed satisfy the Eu-
clidean principle that the probability of an event is strictly greater than the
probability of each of its sub-events. Moreover, the mathematical tech-
niques for generating them are closely related to the techniques that are
used in [Benci et al 2007].
Whatwe shall mean by ‘mathematical universe’ is not the same aswhat
is meant [Benci et al 2007] by the term. The authors of [Benci et al 2007]
impose mainly algebraic constraints on what counts as a mathematical
universe [Benci et al 2007, Introduction]. We, in contrast, take the term
‘mathematical universe’ in the set theoretical sense. Naively, you may take
there to be one preferred set theoretic universe: V. But if you are uncom-
fortable with taking V as given, then you might want to take a mathemat-
ical universe to be a rank Vα that constitutes a model of most or perhaps
even all of the standard principles of set theory. Indeed, we will see that
for random variables defined on any large set S, the general idea of equip-
ping them with a probability function will be the same as that for random
variables on V.
We will discuss two ways of generating non-Archimedean probability
functions for random variables on V. In section 2 a simple way of gen-
erating such probability functions (the finite snapshot approach) will be de-
scribed. In section 3 we go on to discuss how global properties of these
probability functions can be made to hold by imposing constraints on the
process of generating such functions. In section 4, a theoretically more
satisfying but also more complicated way of generating non-Archimedean
probability functions for random variables onV is discussed (the bootstrap-
3
pingmethod).
2 The finite snapshot approach
A random variable τ on V is a function from states to the outcome space,
i.e., an element of VV. So there aremany random variables onV. The aim is
to associate a notion of probability with elements of VV that meet the min-
imal constraints (totality, uniformity and regularity) that were described
in section 1.
In fact, we want to give precise meaning to conditional probability
statements of the form
Pr(σ ∈ A | τ ∈ B),
where σ, τ ∈ VV and A, B ⊆ V. But we will see that it will be sufficient
for our purposes to give meaning to unconditional probability statements
of the form Pr(σ ∈ A). So our fundamental problem amounts to giving
meaning to expressions of the form Pr(σ ∈ A). Such probability measures
will be determined by a choice of a fine ultrafilter on the collection [V]<ω
of finite subsets of the state space.2
The starting point is a fine ultrafilter U on [V]<ω. This fine ultrafilter U
defines a non-Archimedean field FU in the following way.
For any two functions f , g : [V]<ω → Q we define:
Definition 1
f ≈U g ≡ {T ∈ [V]
<ω : f (T) = g(T)} ∈ U .
In words: two functions are identified if they coincide on ultrafilter-many
states.
The relation ≈U is an equivalence relation, so we can take equivalence
classes for which we then have
[ f ]U = [g]U ⇔ f ≈U g.
Moreover, it is again a routine exercise to verify that the [ f ]U ’s form a
hyper-rational field FU .
Now suppose A ⊆ V and θ ∈ VV. Then we define the function fθ∈A :
[V]<ω → Q as follows:
2What follows is an adaptation of the approach of [Brickhill et al 2018, section 2].
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Definition 2 For every T ∈ [V]<ω :
fθ∈A(T) ≡
|{s ∈ T : θ(s) ∈ A}|
|T|
.
In words: for every finite set of states T, fθ∈A(T) is the ratio between the
number of states s in T for which θ(s) ∈ A and the number of states in T.
In this sense, fθ∈A(T) is the probability of θ ∈ A on a finite snapshot of states.
Similarly, we define the function fθ∈A∧ν∈B as follows:
Definition 3 For every T ∈ [V]<ω :
fθ∈A∧ν∈B(T) ≡
|{s ∈ T : θ(s) ∈ A and ν(s) ∈ B}|
|T|
.
Now we are ready to define the probability of θ ∈ A, relative to a fine
(and therefore free) ultrafilter U on [V]<ω:
Definition 4
PrU (θ ∈ A) ≡ [ fθ∈A]U .
Similarly, we define PrU (θ ∈ A ∧ ν ∈ B) as [ fθ∈A∧ν∈B]U . Thus we have
constructed a probability function PrU that takes its values in the hyper-
rational field FU . Such probability functions are sometimes called NAP
functions.
Conditional probability can then be expressed in terms of uncondi-
tional probability:
Definition 5
PrU (θ ∈ A | ν ∈ B) ≡
PrU (θ ∈ A ∧ ν ∈ B)
PrU (ν ∈ B)
.
3 Constraints
From section 1 we know that the aim is not to arrive at a unique (correct)
probability function on V. But we did insist from the outset on our proba-
bility functions satisfying three global constraints: totality, uniformity, and
regularity. It will be shown that these properties are always guaranteed to
hold.
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There are further global conditions on probability functions on V that
seem reasonable to require, and that are not guaranteed to hold without
further work. These global constraints will be explored. We will show
that many of them can be forced to hold by imposing constraints on the
ultrafilters from which the probability functions are generated.
3.1 Elementary properties
The definition of PrU is relative to an initial choice of the fine ultrafilter U .
The properties of PrU depend on U . Nonetheless, certain basic properties
of PrU can be easily seen to hold regardless of which fine ultrafilter U is
chosen:
Proposition 1
1. PrU is a finitely additive probability function;
2. PrU is Euclidean.
Proof. Easy.
Now we define the notion of a diagonal random variable:
Definition 6 A random variable θ is said to be a diagonal random variable if
for any set x, there is exactly one element u of the state space such that θ(u) = x.
In words: a diagonal random variable is a random variable that takes ev-
ery value exactly once.
Using this notion, we define the notions of regularity and uniformity:
Definition 7 (regularity) A probability function PrU is regular if for every di-
agonal random variable θ and for every x ∈ V,PrU (θ = x) > 0.
Definition 8 (uniformity) A probability function PrU is uniform if for every
diagonal random variable θ and for all x, y ∈ V :
PrU (θ = x) = PrU (θ = y).
Proposition 2 For every fine ultrafilter U :
1. PrU is regular;
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2. PrU is uniform.
Proof. These properties are proved as propositions 2.5 and 2.6 in [Brickhill et al 2018,
p. 525–526].
The Euclidean property is formally defined as follows:
Definition 9 (Euclidean) A probability function PrU is Euclidean if for every
diagonal random variable θ and all A, B ⊆ V:
A ( B ⇒ PrU (θ ∈ A) < PrU (θ ∈ B).
Then we have:
Proposition 3 For every fine ultrafilter U , the probability function PrU is Eu-
clidean.
Proof. By finite additivity and regularity.
Now we turn to infinite additivity. Countable additivity means that
the probability of the union of a countable family of disjoint sets is the
infinite sum of the probabilities of the elements of the family, where the
notion of infinite sum is spelled out in terms of the classical notion of limit.
In the present setting, the probability PrU of the union of any family of
disjoint sets is also the infinite sum of the probabilities of the elements of
the family [Benci et al 2013, section 3.4]. But now the notion of infinite
sum is spelled out in terms of the generalised notion of limit based on the
ultrafilter U . More precisely, the new notion of infinite sum is defined as
follows. Suppose we are given a family {qi : i ∈ N} of rational numbers,
and I ⊆ N. Then consider the function f : [N]<ω → Q given by
f (T) = ∑
i∈I∩T
qi.
This function can be seen as giving the value of the infinite sum on all
finite parts (“snapshots”) of the index set. So we identify the infinite sum
of the family {qi : i ∈ I} of rational numbers with the generalised limit of
f according to the ultrafilter U :
Definition 10
∑
i∈I
∗
qi ≡ [ f ]U .
7
Using this notion of infinite sum, we can express the probability of the
union of a disjoint family of sets as the sum of the probabilities of the
members of that family:
Proposition 4 If A =
⋃
i∈I Ai, with Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for all i, j ∈ I, then for every
random variable τ:
PrU (τ ∈ A) = ∑
i∈I
∗
PrU (τ ∈ Ai).
In sum, PrU has a natural infinite additivity property that is sometimes
called perfect additivity.
Proposition 5 For every fine ultrafilter U , the probability function PrU is per-
fectly additive.
Proof. This proposition is proved as proposition 8 in [Benci et al 2013, p. 132–
133].
3.2 Symmetry principles
From now on, the symbol θ will be used to refer to some arbitrary diagonal
random variable. When it is not assumed that the random variable in
question is diagonal, we will write τ.
The Euclidean-ness of PrU has implications for symmetry principles. As
a rule of thumb, one can say that symmetry principles fail.3
Proposition 6 For every fine ultraflter U , the probability function PrU is not
invariant under all permutations of V.
Proof. We concentrate on N as it is canonically represented in V (by means of
the Zermelo ordinals, for instance). Define a permutation pi of V as follows:
• pi(x) = x for x ∈ V \N; Otherwise:
• pi(x) = x+ 2 for x even;
• pi(1) = 0;
• pi(x) = x− 2 for x odd and > 1.
3See [Benci et al 2007], [Benci et al 2013], [Benci et al 2018].
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Let A ≡ {0, 2, 4, . . .}, and let θ be a diagonal random variable. Then pi(A) ( A.
Therefore, by the Euclidean principle, PrU (θ ∈ pi(A)) < PrU (θ ∈ A).
This of course entails that there are diagonal random variables θ, θ′ such
that for some A ⊆ V,
PrU (θ ∈ A) 6= PrU (θ
′ ∈ A).
One popular global constraint on probability measures is translation-
invariance. The Lebesgue measure has this property, and Banach limits
seem to occupy a privileged position in the class of generalised limits at
least in part because they are translation-invariant. In our context, translation-
invariance does not make obvious sense. For a random class A, it is not
clear what ‘A+ α’ (where α is a number) means. But a clear interpretation
of ‘adding an ordinal number’ can of course be given if A is a collection of
ordinals:
Definition 11 For A any collection of ordinals:
A⊕ α ≡ {β : ∃γ ∈ A such that β = γ + α}.
Then for A to be translation-invariant means that for all ordinals α and for
every θ,
PrU (θ ∈ A) = PrU (θ ∈ A⊕ α).
However, even if we consider non-Archimedean measures (of the kind
that we have been describing) on ordinals, translation-invariance conflicts
with the Euclidean Property of our generalised probability functions. In
particular, there is no NAP probability function PrU on any infinite cardi-
nal κ such that there is even one ordinal α with 0 < α < κ and
PrU (θ ∈ κ) = PrU (θ ∈ κ ⊕ α).
The reason is simple. We have κ⊕ α = κ\α ( κ, so if we had PrU (θ ∈ κ) =
PrU (θ ∈ κ ⊕ α), then we would contradict the Euclidean principle.
As this example shows, such translations arent necessarily one to one
so we may not want full invariance in general. In [Benci et al 2007, section
1.3], Benci, Forti, and Di Nasso explore a restricted notion of translation-
invariance of NAP-likemeasures on ordinals. We do not pursue this theme
further here, but only pause to note that there are other reasonable-looking
principles that are hard to satisfy. In the context of their theory of numerosi-
ties, Benci, Forti, and Di Nasso consider a principle that in the present con-
text would take the following form:
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Definition 12 (Difference Principle)
∀A, B ∈ V : PrU (θ ∈ A) < PrU (θ ∈ B) ⇒
∃C ∈ V : PrU (θ ∈ B) = PrU (θ ∈ A) + PrU (θ ∈ C).
On countable sample spaces, the difference principle can be made to hold
by building PrU from a selective ultrafilter [Benci et al 2003]. But the exis-
tence of selective ultrafilters is independent of ZFC. As far as we know,
it is an open whether the difference principle can be consistently made to
hold for NAP probability functions on uncountable sample spaces.
3.3 Probability and cardinality
In this (sub-)section we investigate the relation between our notion of gen-
eralised probability on the one hand, and the familiar notion of cardinality
on the other hand.
3.3.1 Hume’s principle for probability
One might naively wonder whether the following probabilistic analogue
of Hume’s Principle for cardinality can hold:
Definition 13 (Hume’s principle for probability) For all A, B ∈ V:
|A| = |B| ⇒ PrU (τ ∈ A) = PrU (τ ∈ B).
But the probability functions PrU that we have been considering cannot
satisfy Hume’s principle for probability, as its failure is an immediate con-
sequence of Proposition 6: invariance under permutations and Hume’s
principle for probability are mathematically equivalent. However, this
was only to be expected. After all, we do not expect Kolmogorov prob-
ability (on infinite spaces) to satisfy any such principle.
3.3.2 Superregularity
The hyper-rational field FU in which the probability functions PrU take
their values contain infinitesimal numbers—this is whatmakes it non-Archi-
medean. We will write PrU (σ ∈ A) ≈ 0 if PrU (σ ∈ A) < n
−1 for each
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n ∈ N. And we will write PrU (σ ∈ A) ≪ PrU (τ ∈ B) if
PrU (σ ∈ A)
PrU (τ ∈ B)
≈ 0.
We have seen that PrU cannot satisfy Hume’s principle for probability.
But, at least at first sight, it seems that it would be reasonable to demand:
|A| < |B| ⇒ PrU (δ ∈ A) < PrU (δ ∈ B).
Indeed, if in addition |B| ≥ ω, then we might even expect
|A| < |B| ⇒ PrU (σ ∈ A) ≪ PrU (σ ∈ B).
Further, this may be expected to hold if B is a proper class but A is a set .
The result is a size constraint which is a strengthening of the requirement
of regularity:
Definition 14 (Superregularity)
ω ≤ |A| < |B| ≤ |V| ⇒ PrU (θ ∈ A) ≪ PrU (θ ∈ B).
Note that if A is finite and B is infinite then the consequent holds auto-
matically.
By a suitable restriction on admissible ultrafilters U , superregularity
can indeed be made to hold:
Theorem 1 There are fine ultrafilters U such that PrU is superregular.
Proof.
If A, B ∈ V such that ω ≤ |A| < |B| are given, then we have PrU (θ ∈
A) ≪ PrU (θ ∈ B) if and only if for each n ∈ N,
{D ∈ [V]<ω :
Pr(θ ∈ A | θ ∈ D)
Pr(θ ∈ B | θ ∈ D)
≤ n−1} ∈ U .
The aim is to build an ultrafilter U for which this holds.
For any n ∈ N, define
CnAB ≡ {D ∈ [V]
<ω :
Pr(θ ∈ A | θ ∈ D)
Pr(θ ∈ B | θ ∈ D)
≤ n−1}.
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Moreover, let
Ax ≡ {D ∈ [V]
<ω : x ∈ D}.
Define also
F ≡ {CnAB : n ∈ N, |A| < |B|} ∪ {Ax : x ∈ V}.
We want to prove that F has the finite intersection property. Therefore take any
x1, . . . , xk ∈ V, and any 〈A1, B1, n1〉, . . . , 〈Al, Bl, nl〉 such that
∣
∣Aj
∣
∣ <
∣
∣Bj
∣
∣ and
nj ∈ N for j ≤ l. Assume for the construction that |A1| ≤ |A2| ≤ · · · ≤ |Al|.
For every finite D, if {x1, . . . .xk} ⊆ D, then D ∈
⋂
i≤k Axi . So setting n =
max{nj : j < l} we will extend {x1, . . . .xk} to a set in C
n
AjBj
, and hence C
nj
AjBj
,
for each j ≤ l. Set F0 = {x1, . . . .xk} and a0 = |F0 ∩ A1|. As B1 is infinite and
of larger cardinality than A1 we add n · a0 elements of B1 \ A1 to F0, yielding a
finite set F1. Now set a1 = |F1 ∩ A2|, and add n · a1 elements of B2 \ (A1 ∪ A2)
to F1 to give F2. Note we can find these elements of B2 as |B2| > |A2| ≥ |A1|.
Continuing in this manner, set F = Fl . Then we have ensured that for all j ≤ l
Pr(θ ∈ Aj | θ ∈ F)
Pr(θ ∈ Bj | θ ∈ F)
≤ n−1,
and so we have F ∈ CnAjBj , and since D ⊆ F, we also have F ∈
⋂
i≤k Axi .
So F indeed has the finite intersection property, whereby it can be extended
to a filter and then further to an ultrafilter U . By design, then, the resulting
probability function PrU is super-regular.
Once again, Hume’s Principle for probability cannot hold for the no-
tion of probability that we are investigating. But this leaves open the ques-
tion whether the converse of Hume’s Principle for probability can be made
to hold. This is called Cantor’s Principle in [Benci et al 2007], where the au-
thors investigate it in the context of their Euclidean theory of size:
Definition 15 (Cantor’s Principle)
PrU (θ ∈ A) = PrU (θ ∈ B)⇒ |A| = |B| .
Benci, Forti, and Di Nasso prove that ‘Cantor’s Principle’ can be made to
hold [Benci et al 2007, section 3.2]. It is also clear that Cantor’s Principle
follows from super-regularity.
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3.3.3 The power set principle
The question whether
∀A, B ∈ V : |A| < |B| ⇒ |P(A)| < |P(B)|
is true, is independent of the axioms of set theory. (Of course the principle
is true if the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis holds.) Like the cardi-
nality operator, our NAP probability functions are measures of some kind.
One might wonder what should follow from PrU (θ ∈ A) < PrU (θ ∈ B). In
particular, given that PrU is intended to be a fine-grained quantitative pos-
sibility measure, perhaps probability should be expected to co-vary with
the power set operation in some fairly direct manner. In other words, it is
natural to ask if the following principle can be made to hold:
Definition 16 (Power Set Condition)
∀A, B ∈ V : PrU (θ ∈ A) < PrU (θ ∈ B) ⇔ PrU (θ ∈ P(A)) < PrU (θ ∈ P(B)).
It turns out that the power set condition can indeed be satisfied:
Theorem 2 There are fine ultrafilters U such that PrU satisfies the power set
condition.
The argument for this is somewhat more involved.
We aim to prove Theorem 2 by building the probability function up
from an ultrafilter U which is based on a pre-filter C ⊆ P([V]<ω) that has
the finite intersection property.
The class C is built up in stages, and in such a way that it eventually
witnesses the truth of the power set condition for all A, B ∈ V.
Stage 0
The class C0 consists of all
Ax ≡ {a ∈ [V]
<ω : x ∈ a},
for x ∈ V. This is to ensure that the ultrafilter that will be built from C is
fine. We know that C0 has the finite intersection property.
Limit stages
For limit stages λ, we simply set Cλ ≡
⋃
β<λ Cβ.
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Successor stages
Given fine-ness, we may, and will, ignore the elements of Vω. At stage
α > ω, where α is a successor ordinal, we consider the sets of Vα\Vα−1 and
ensure that the power set condition eventually holds for all these sets and
their power sets, by adding families of finite sets to Cα−1 in such a way
that the finite intersection property is preserved.
As an illustrative and indeed representative example we do the case
where α = ω + 1.
Let there be given an enumeration {A1, B1}, . . . , {Aβ, Bβ}, . . . of the
pairs of elements of Vω+1\Vω.
For the induction, we assume that, by having added appropriate sets
of finite sets to C0, the power set condition holds for {A1, B1}, . . . , {Aβ, Bβ}
and their power sets, and that in the process the finite intersection prop-
erty has been preserved. The aim is now to extend this so that it also holds
for {Aβ+1, Bβ+1}. In other words, we have constructed C
β
1 , and we want
to obtain C
β+1
1 , where C
0
1 ≡ C0.
Definition 17
CA<B ≡ {D ∈ [V]
<ω :
|A ∩ D|
|D|
<
|B ∩ D|
|D|
}.
Definition 18
CA≥B ≡ {D ∈ [V]
<ω :
|A ∩ D|
|D|
≥
|B ∩ D|
|D|
}.
Claim
Either C
β
1 ∪{CAβ<Bβ} has the finite intersection property, or C
β
1 ∪{CAβ≥Bβ}
has the finite intersection property (or both).
Proof
Suppose not. Then there is a finite intersection F of elements of C
β
1 such
that F ∩ CAβ<Aβ = ∅, and there is a finite intersection F
′ of elements of C
β
1
such that F′ ∩ CAβ≥Bβ = ∅. But then (F ∩ F
′)∩ CAβ<Bβ = ∅ and (F ∩ F
′)∩
CAβ≥Bβ = ∅. But CAβ<Bβ ∪ CAβ≥Bβ = [V]
<ω. So then (F ∩ F′) = ∅. But
this contradicts the inductive assumption that C
β
1 has the finite intersection
property.
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Thus define C
β+1
1 to be C
β
1 ∪ {CAβ<Bβ} if this has the finite intersection
property, or C
β
1 ∪{CAβ≥Bβ} otherwise, and by the claim, C
β+1
1 has the finite
intersection property. Now setting C−1 ≡
⋃
β C
β
1 , we may conclude that C
−
1
has the finite intersection property.
At this point we must extend C−1 by adding to C
−
1 :
• every set of the form CP(A)<P(B) such that CA<B ∈ C
−
1 ;
• every set of the form CP(A)≥P(B) such that CA≥B ∈ C
−
1 .
Call the resulting set C1. Our aim is to prove that C1 has the finite intersec-
tion property.
Consider an arbitrary non-empty finite family F ⊆ C1. Without loss of
generality wemay assume that the ‘judgements’ inF of the form CP(A)<P(B)
or CP(A)≥P(B), taken together, describe a finite total pre-ordering relation
R on some set {P(A1), . . . ,P(Ak)}. Further, we may also assume that for
and sets A and B from Vω+1\Vω, CP(A)<P(B) ∈ F if and only if CA<B ∈ F ,
and CP(A)≥P(B) iff CA≥B ∈ F . Thus F contains witnesses for all the rele-
vant judgements we may be interested in.
Let F− = F ∩ C−1 , so F
− consists only of judgements about sets in
Vω+1\Vω. Then we know from the foregoing that
⋂
F− 6= ∅. So take
some F− ∈
⋂
F−. Our plan is inductively to extend F−, using the pre-
order R, to a finite set F ∈
⋂
F .
We will add to F− elements that ensure that the constraints of R are
satisfied. Moreover, by choosing the elements to be added to F− from
Vω+1\Vω,
4 we ensure that the constraints imposed byF− remain satisfied.
As a result, F will satisfy all constraints from F , so
⋂
F 6= ∅ and hence C1
has the finite intersection property.
As an example, suppose that
R = P(A1) < P(A2) < P(A3) = P(A4).
(1) We start by ensuring that P(A1) < P(A2) is satisfied.
Suppose that F− already contains n elements of P(A1). Since CA1<A2 ∈
F , there must be an element x− ∈ A2\A1. This implies that there are
infinitely many infinite sets x in P(A2)\P(A1) such that x
− ∈ x: we add
n+ 1 such elements to F−, and call the resulting finite set F−1 .
4For later stages we will take these sets from Vα+1\Vα, i.e. sets of rank α.
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(2) We proceed in similar fashion to ensure that P(A2) < P(A3) is satis-
fied:
Suppose that F−1 already contains m elements from P(A2), observing
that it may be the case that m > n + 1, for there may already be a finite
number of elements of P(A2) in F
−. Since CA2<A3 ∈ F , there must be an
element y−1 ∈ A3\A2, and since CA1<A3 ∈ F , there must be an element
y−2 ∈ A3\A1. So there are infinitely many infinite sets y in P(A3) such
that y−1 , y
−
2 ∈ y: add m+ 1 such elements to F
−
1 , and call the resulting set
F−2 .
(3) Now suppose that there are m1 elements of P(A3) in F
−
2 , and m2 el-
ements of P(A4) in F
−
2 . Moreover, suppose that m2 < m1. (The case
where m1 < m2 is similar.) Since CA3≥A4 ,CA4≥A3 ∈ F , but also A3 6= A4,
there must be some x1 ∈ A3\A4 and some x2 ∈ A4\A3. Moreover, since
CA1<A4,CA2<A4 ∈ F , there are elements x3 ∈ A4\A1, x4 ∈ A4\A2. So
P(A4) contains infinitely many infinite sets x such that {x2, x3, x4} ⊂ x.
Similarly, P(A3) contains infinitely many infinite sets x that are outside
P(A1),P(A2),P(A4). So we add a sufficient number of such elements to
F−2 so that there are an equal number p of “witnesses” for P(A3) as for
P(A4) but where p is larger than the number of witnesses for P(A2). Call
the resulting set F−3 .
(4) To conclude, we set F ≡ F−3 . It is clear that F ∈
⋂
F .
This procedure of extending F− easily generalises to any finite total
pre-ordering on {P(A1), . . . ,P(Ak)}. Thus we have shown that C1 has
the finite intersection property.
This procedure for extending C0 to C1 while preserving the finite in-
tersection property also works for larger successor ordinals: at level Vα+1
(stage β + 1 with α = ω + β) we can extend the corresponding F− using
subsets of rank α. As we have said above, at limit stages we can simply
take unions. Ultimately we set C ≡
⋃
α∈On Cα.
The class C will then have the finite intersection property, so it can be
extended to a filter and then to an ultrafilter U . The probability function
based on U will make the power set condition true for all A, B ∈ V, and
this concludes the proof of theorem 2.
Our proof actually shows something slightly stronger: for all A, Bwith
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|A| , |B| ≥ ω, we have
PrU (θ ∈ A) < PrU (θ ∈ B) ⇔ PrU (θ ∈ P(A)) ≪ PrU (θ ∈ P(B)).
The reason is that in enlarging the set F− we always have infinitely many
elements to choose from.
For any probability measure PrU that satisfies power set condition we
also have that ∀A, B ∈ V, ∀n ∈ ω:
PrU (θ ∈ A) < PrU (θ ∈ B)⇔ PrU (θ ∈ P
n(A)) < PrU (θ ∈ P
n(B))
where Pn(A) = P(P(. . . P(A) . . . )). An easy argument shows this can-
not extend to infinite applications of the power set operation.
One might wonder whether the motivations behind the power set con-
dition should not also support imposing the following restricted power set
condition on PrU :
5
Question 1 Are there probability measures such that
∀A, B ∈ V : PrU (θ ∈ A) < PrU (θ ∈ B) ⇔ PrU (θ ∈ [A]
<ω) < PrU (θ ∈ [B]
<ω)?
3.4 The ordinals
For α ≥ ω, in each level Vα+1 \Vα of the iterative hierarchy one finds only
one ordinal, but infinitely many sets that are not ordinals. This might lead
one to believe that a probability function on V should satisfy
PrU (θ ∈ On) ≈ 0,
where ‘On’ is the class of ordinals.
Just as it seems reasonable to require that the probability of choosing
an even natural number from the set of natural numbers must be equal
to or infinitesimally close to 12 (see [Wenmackers et al 2013, section 6.2]), it
seems reasonable to require that
PrU (θ ∈ Even | θ ∈ On) ≈
1
2
,
where ‘Even’ is the class of even ordinals, which is defined in the obvious
way.
5Thanks to Philip Welch for this question.
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Moreover, between any two limit ordinals there are infinitely many
successor ordinals, so one might expect
PrU (θ ∈ Lim | θ ∈ On) ≈ 0,
where ‘Lim’ is the class of limit ordinals.
We will sketch how probability functions can be constructed that meet
these expectations. Indeed, we will see that there are probability functions
that meet these ‘ordinal expectations’ and in addition meet the size con-
straint of super-regularity.
Theorem 3 There are super-regular probability functions Pr such that:
1. PrU (θ ∈ On) ≈ 0;
2. PrU (θ ∈ Even | θ ∈ On) ≈ 2
−1;
3. PrU (θ ∈ Lim | θ ∈ On) ≈ 0.
Proof. As before, the aim is wisely to choose the ultrafilter U on which PrU is
based. We want U to be such that for all k, l,m ∈ N:
•
PrU (θ∈A)
PrU (θ∈B)
≤ k−1 if ω ≤ |A| < |B| ;
• PrU (θ ∈ Even | θ ∈ On) − PrU (θ ∈ Odd | θ ∈ On) ≤ l
−1 and
PrU (θ ∈ Lim | θ ∈ On) ≤ l
−1;
• PrU (θ ∈ On) ≤ m
−1.
Now we define:
• Ax ≡ {D ∈ [V]<ω : x ∈ D};
• CkAB ≡ {D ∈ [V]
<ω : Pr[A|D]
Pr[B|D]
≤ k−1};
• I l ≡ {D ∈ [V]<ω : ∀α ∈ D∃β∃n ≥ l(α ∈ [β, β + n] ⊆ D)};
• Wm ≡ {D ∈ [V]<ω : Pr[On | D] ≤ m−1}.
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And now we set:
F0 ≡ {Ax,C
k
AB, I
l,Wm : x ∈ V, k, l,m ∈ N and ω ≤ |A| < |B|}
Claim: F0 has the finite intersection property.
Let some x1, . . . , xn be given. Now
⋂
i≤n I
li = I l where l = max{li : i < n},
and similarly for
⋂
i≤nW
mi , so as before in theorem 1, it suffices to concentrate
on the highest values of k, l,m.
(1) A ∈
⋂
i≤n Axi ⇔ {x1, . . . , xn} ⊆ A. So we start with the finite set A0 ≡
{x1, . . . , xn}, and will extend it.
(2) Again we concentrate on one pair 〈A, B〉 such that ω ≤ |A| < |B|; we leave
out further cases as they are similar. There are arbitrarily large finite subsets
C ⊆ B that are l-isolated from elements of A0, meaning that each ordinal in C is
more than l ordinals removed from any ordinal in A. We choose any such C ⊆ B
that is of size at least k · n, and we set A1 ≡ A0 ∪ C.
(3) Now we extend A1 to ensure that all ordinal intervals are of length ≥ l: for
each α ∈ A1, we add α + 1, . . . , α + l. Call the resulting finite collection A2.
Note that by our choice of l-isolated elements in (2), none of α + 1, . . . , α + l are
elements of A.
(4) Let |A2| = j. Then we add j ·m elements of V \ (A ∪ B∪On) to A2 and call
the resulting set A3.
It is now routine to verify that A3 ∈
⋂
i≤n Axi ∩ C
k
AB ∩ I
l ∩Wm. The case
including further sets CkA′B′ is similar, thus the claim is verified. So F0 indeed
has the finite intersection property, whereby it can be extended to a filter and then
further to an ultrafilter U . By design, the resulting probability function PrU has
the required properties.
4 The bootstrapping approach
The probability PrU (θ ∈ A) is obtained by ‘summing up’ the probabilities
Pr(θ ∈ A | θ ∈ S) for all ‘small’ parts S of V; such Pr(θ ∈ A | θ ∈ S) are
seen as approximations of PrU (θ ∈ A).
In the finite snapshot approach, ‘small’ in this context means ‘finite’.
But from a conceptual point of view, ‘finite’ might be taken to be too small
as far as the test sets (or snapshots) are concerned. Compared to V, all sets
—and not just the finite sets— are small. So to determine PrU (θ ∈ A), we
should take the ‘limit’ of the values Pr(θ ∈ A | θ ∈ S), where S is a set of
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any size. Then if S is infinite, Pr(θ ∈ A | θ ∈ S) cannot just be taken to be
given by the ratio formula but needs to be defined.
In the approach to which we now turn (the bootstrapping approach),
a probability PrU (θ ∈ A) is determined by the probabilities PrU (θ ∈ A |
θ ∈ S), where PrU (θ ∈ A | θ ∈ S), for S a large set, is then in turn
determined by probabilities PrU (θ ∈ A | θ ∈ S
′) for S′ being smaller
‘snapshots’ than S, and so on, until we reach the finite snapshots and can
appeal to the probability functions that were discussed in the previous
sections. Thus the bootstrapping account can be seen as a generalisation of
the finite snapshot approach.
4.1 The rough idea
In general terms, this is how we will proceed:
(1) By the construction from the previous section, a fine ultrafilter on [S]<ω
yields a notion of probability on all sets S ∈ V with |S| < ω1. In other
words, this yields a suitable notion of probability, call it PrS, for every
countable set S.
(2) The notion of PrS for all S ∈ V with |S| < ω2 is determined using the
notion of probability on countable sets: the probability of A on such an S
is determined by the class of probabilities of A on the countable ‘snap-
shots’ of S. Using these countable probability functions, a fine ultrafilter
on [S]<ω1 gives us a notion of probability on sets S with |S| < ω2.
Again the resulting functions PrS are essentially NAP-functions as de-
fined in [Benci et al 2013]. They are total, regular, etc.
. . .
(β) A fine ultrafilter on [S]<ωα , together with probability functions PrS for
all S such that |S| < ωα, yields a notion of probability on all sets S with
|S| < ωα+1.
. . .
Limit stages of course do not present a problem. So by transfinite re-
cursion on cardinality this yields for every set S a notion PrS of probability
on S.
Then a fine ultrafilter U on V = [V]<Card yields, using the general no-
tion PrS for S ∈ V, a notion PrV that is a total (class) function from proper-
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ties A and random variables θ to values PrV(θ ∈ A) in a non-Archimedean
class field. This probability function again satisfies the principles of the
theory NAP in [Benci et al 2013].
For this construction, what we need is suitable (fine) ultrafilters on
small, and somewhat larger, and large, . . . sets, and a fine ultrafilter U
on [V]<Card. But we will see that all the set ultrafilters used in the con-
struction can be uniformly obtained as restrictions to sets S of the given fine
ultrafilter on [V]<Card. So PrV is determined by one initial choice of U ,
whereby PrV can be seen as the ‘limit’ of its set-restrictions PrS, where the
functions PrS can in turn be seen as ‘limits’ of restrictions to their small
subsets. This uniform construction has the advantage that the resulting
probability functions are all coherent, in the sense that for a set T, PrS(A|T)
is the same for all S ⊇ T and hence also for V.
Now it is time to look at details of the construction.
4.2 Details 1: Restrictions of fine ultrafilters
Since our construction involves ultrafilters on sets [S]<κ with κ > ω, we
make the following definition, which accords with the usual definition of
fineness on [S]<ω.
Definition 19 For any infinite cardinal κ, an ultrafilter on [S]<κ is fine iff for
every x ∈ S :
{T ∈ [S]<κ : x ∈ T} ∈ U .
The notion of ‘set-fine’ ultrafilter on V is defined in the obvious way.
We first show that appropriate restrictions of ultrafilters to smaller sets
can be obtained in a uniform fashion.
Definition 20 Suppose S ∈ V, |S| = κ, and U a fine ultrafilter on [S]<κ , and
S′ ⊆ S with |S′| = α < κ. Then we define the restriction US′ of U to S
′ as
follows.
For any X ∈ P([S]<κ), let
XS′ ≡ {y | ∃z ∈ X : y = z ∩ S
′ and |y| < α}.
Then US′ ≡ {XS′ | X ∈ U}.
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Proposition 7 For any S ∈ V with |S| = κ, there are fine ultrafilters U on [S]<κ
that restrict to a fine ultrafilter on every S′ ⊆ S with |S′| = α, and ω ≤ α < κ.
Further, such ultrafilters are coherent in that if T ⊂ S′ with ω ≤ |T| < |S′|,
then (US′)T = UT.
Proof. We build the ultrafilter from a pre-filterF0 (i.e., a set with the finite inter-
section property), which can then be extended to a filter and then to an ultrafilter.
For each x ∈ S, let
Ax ≡ {X ∈ [S]
<κ : x ∈ X}.
And let for each S′ with |S′| = α < κ and S′ ⊆ S:
RS
′
≡ {X ∈ [S]<κ : X ∩ S′ ∈ [S′]<α}.
Now set
F0 ≡ {Ax : x ∈ S} ∪ {R
S′ : S′ ⊆ S and
∣
∣S′
∣
∣ < κ}.
It is easy to see that F0 has the finite intersection property and so can be extended
to an ultrafilter U . And by design, U is fine.
Clearly US′ ⊆ P([S
′ ]<α).We must check the fine ultrafilter properties:
(1) Fine. This follows from the fact that U is fine: for x ∈ S′ this is witnessed by
(Ax)S′ .
(2) Finite intersection. Let X,Y ∈ US′ . Then there are X,Y ∈ U such that
X = XS′ and Y = YS′. By the finite intersection property of U , we know that
X ∩Y ∈ U . But X ∩Y ⊇ (X ∩Y)S′ . So X ∩Y ∈ US′ .
(3) Ultra. Take any X ⊆ [S′]<α, and let Xc ≡ [S′]<α\X. Let X ≡ {x ∈ [S]<κ |
x ∩ S′ ∈ X} and let Xc ≡ {x ∈ [S]<κ | x ∩ S′ 6∈ X}. Then Xc = [S]<κ\X.
By the ultra property for U , we have X ∈ U or Xc ∈ U . But X = XS′ and
Xc = XcS′ . So X ∈ US′ or X
c ∈ US′ .
(4) Non-principality. This is implied by fineness.
(5) Empty set property: We have to show that ∅ 6∈ US′ . It suffices to show that
for each X ∈ U , XS′ 6= ∅. Since R
S′ ∈ U , X ∩ RS
′
6= ∅. But for any set x in
this intersection, x ∩ S′ ∈ [S′]<α. So x ∩ S′ ∈ XS′ 6= ∅.
For coherence, take T ⊂ S′ ⊂ S with |T| < |S′| < |S| and let X ∈ U . As
RS
′
∈ U it is enough to show that ((X ∩ RS
′
)S′)T = (X ∩ R
S′)T. Now ((X ∩
RS
′
)S′)T = {y | ∃z ∈ X ∩ R
S′ : y = z ∩ T, |y| < |T| and |z ∩ S′| < |S′|}, but
by definition, for any z ∈ RS
′
we have |z ∩ S′| < |S′|. Thus ((X ∩ RS
′
)S′)T =
{y | ∃z ∈ X ∩ RS
′
: y = z ∩ T and |y| < |T|} = (X ∩ RS
′
)T.
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But this means that this property must also hold for fine ultrafilters on
[V]<Card :
Consequence 1 There are fine ultrafilters U on [V]<Card, such that for every set
S with |S| = α, US is a fine ultrafilter on [S]
<α and the coherence property holds.
Proof. By the same reasoning as in the previous proposition.
4.3 Details 2: defining probability functions
Now we show how for every set, a probability function on that set can
be defined. The same procedure can then be used to define a probability
function on V, and these probability functions are coherent.
The key is to spell out what is involved in the β-th step of the recursive
procedure for defining probabilities on sets:
(β) A fine ultrafilter U on [S]<ωβ (with ωβ = |S|), together with probability
functions PrT for all T such that |T| < ωβ, yields a notion of probability
Pr
S on S.
As in section 2, we define a function fθ∈A such that for all T ∈ [S]
<ωβ :
fθ∈A(T) ≡ Pr
T(θ ∈ A ∩ T).
Similarly, we define a function fθ∈A∧ν∈B such that for all T ∈ [S]
<ωβ :
fθ∈A∧ν∈B(T) ≡ Pr
T(θ ∈ A ∩ T ∧ ν ∈ B ∩ T).
Then PrS(θ ∈ A) is defined as [ fθ∈A]U , and Pr
S(θ ∈ A | ν ∈ B) is defined
as
[ fθ∈A∧ν∈B]U
[ fν∈B]U
.
This function PrS will then be an NAP probability function in the sense of
[Benci et al 2013].
Now in an exactly similar way, we define a class probability function
Pr
+
U on V, using the probability functions on ‘small’ classes (i.e., sets) and
ultrafilters on ‘small’ classes which (given proposition 7) we can now as-
sume to have been defined on the basis of an ultrafilter U on [V]<Card with
which we start. The function Pr+U is total, regular, and uniform for the
same reasons as why its ‘smaller cousin’ PrU has these properties.
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We now check coherence. We will do this only for straight probabilities
rather than random variables in general, as although coherence holds for
random variables also, it is much more technical to state. Below we use
Pr(A) to denote Pr(ι ∈ A) where ι s the identity random variable.
Proposition 8 For any class A and sets T ⊂ S with |T| < |S| we have
Pr
T(A) = PrS(A|T).
Proof. We show by induction on |T| that that the above holds for all S ⊃ T with
|S| > |T|. Strictly speaking, the range of PrT may be a different non-archimedean
field to the range of PrS, but there is a natural embedding of the former into the
latter defined by i([ f ]UT ) = [ f¯ ]US where for X ∈ S
<|S|, f¯ (X) = f (X ∩ T). This
is well-defined as {X ∈ S<|S| : |X ∩ T| < |T|} = (RT)S ∈ US.
Using this embedding we have i(PrT(A)) = i([ fA]UT) = [
¯fA]US . Now for
X ∈ (RT)S(∈ US) we have:
¯fA(X) = fA(X ∩ T) = fA∩T(X ∩ T) = Pr
X∩T(A ∩ T).
As X ∈ (RT)S we have |X ∩ T| < |T| so by our inductive hypothesis
Pr
X∩T(A ∩ T) = PrX(A ∩ T|T) =
fA∩T(X)
fT(X)
.
But by definition,
[ fA∩T
fT
]
US
= PrS(A|T), so [ ¯fA]US = Pr
S(A|T) and we’re done.
4.4 Comparison of the finite snapshot approach and the
bootstrapping approach
In our definition of the probability of a set theoretic property, the prob-
ability Pr+U (θ ∈ A) of a property A is determined by the probabilities
PrS(θ ∈ A) of A on large ‘snapshots’ S, where a probability PrS(θ ∈ A)
(for S a large set) is then in turn determined by the probabilities PrS
′
(θ ∈ A
for S′ being smaller ‘snapshots’ than S, and so on. Conceptually, the def-
inition in section 4.3 is superior to the simpler definition suggested from
section 2: we want to take the behaviour of the property on as many and
as large ‘snapshots‘ as possible into account.
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It is not straightforward to compare the simple and the more involved
definition: the simple method is based on an ultrafilter on [V]<ω whereas
the more involved method is based on an ultrafilter on V = [V]<Card.
The obvious suggestion is to base the comparison on the relation be-
tween a probability function determined by an ultrafilter U on [V]<Card
and its restriction6 to [V]<ω defined as U ↾ ω = {X ∩ [V]<ω|X ∈ U}. But:
Proposition 9 Not all ultrafilters on [V]<Card restrict to ultrafilters on to [V]<ω.
Proof. ConsiderA∪ [V]<ω, whereA is the set of atoms (guaranteeing fine-ness)
and [V]<ω is the relative complement of [V]<ω in [V]<Card. Then A ∪ [V]<ω
has the finite intersection property and so can be extended to a fine ultrafilter U
on [V]<Card. But ∅ ∈ U ↾ ω. So U does not restrict to an ultrafilter on [V]<ω.
On the other hand, every fine ultrafilter on [V]<Card restricting to an
ultrafilter on [V]<ω essentially is an ultrafilter on [V]<ω:
Proposition 10 Suppose U is a fine ultrafilter on [V]<Card restricting to an ul-
trafilter U ↾ ω on [V]<ω. Then [V]<ω ∈ U .
Proof. Since U is ultra, we have [V]<ω ∈ U or [V]<ω ∈ U . But if [V]<ω ∈ U ,
then ∅ ∈ U ↾ ω, so that U does not restrict, contradicting the assumption. So
[V]<ω ∈ U .
This means that the essentially involved probability functions on V can-
not be reduced to ‘simple’ probability functions on V.
5 Conclusion
In this article we have explored two methods for modelling, by means
of non-Archimedean probability functions, the properties of random vari-
ables ranging over the set theoretic universe: the finite snapshot method
and the bootstrapping method. Concerning the finite snapshot method,
we found that many of the probabilistic properties that seem intuitively
plausible can be satisfied. The bootstrapping method is more satisfying
from a conceptual point of view, but we have only been able to show that
the resulting probability functions satisfy minimal requirements. So much
work remains to be done.
6This is a different notion of restriction to that defined in the previous section as here
we are only restricting the index, while the underlying class remains the same (V).
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